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          i)    tb = -Tb      with     Tb = Cb / (2 P2b – 1)   if    P0b ≤ 1/2 < P2b  
(27)  
        ii)    tp = -Cp / (2 B – 1),   Tp = -tp   if  A ≤ 1/2 < B 
These solutions derive from the hypothesis made that when the two agents make an effort, they 
expect a benefit large enough to cover the cost incurred to achieve the goal. If on the other hand 
they make no effort they will be punished by the politician. The punishment is the politician’s 
reward  to the agents when they reach a bad performance. In this case, therefore, the agents obtain a 
negative expected benefit. 
Keeping in mind that the politician’s expected utility function in the non-electoral period is: 
(28) E(U – u ) = H’ – u(Tb) P2b - u(tb) (1 - P2b) - u(Tp) B - u(tp) (1 - B) 
If we substitute the incentive payments in the politician’s utility function E(U – u), as we did in the 
previous case, we obtain  
(29) E(U – u) = H’- (1/2) {[Cb2 / (2 P2b - 1)] + [Cp2 / (2 B -1)]}  
 
5. Contract with a single agent in the electoral period. 
Let us now consider the case where both the functions are delegated to a single authority, the central 
bank. To see whether this situation is advantageous for the politician, we have to calculate the 
expected utility and compare it with the expected utility with two separate authorities. 
We suppose that the politician will offer four different incentive payments  to the CB, according to 
whether four different events take place. In particular, the politician will give to the agent 
    
T10         if                 E1 =  Bs∩-Ps 
T11           “                E2 =  Bs∩Ps 
T01           “                E3 = -Bs∩Ps 
T00           “                E4 = -Bs∩-Ps 
                                                                                                                                                                  
However, these solutions, which are not very interesting from an economic point of view, will be disregarded; only i) 
will be considered. This does not change the results. 
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with  (presumably)  T10 ≥ T11 ≥ T00 ≥ T01 . 
We should remember that in the electoral period the politician prefers price instability because an 
inflationist policy, for the reasons seen in the previous sections, increases his probability of re-
election.  
The politician’s expected net utility in the electoral period is therefore: 
  (1)’       E(U-u | e10) = [G - u(T11)] Pr(E2 | e10) + [G (1 + R) – u(T10)] Pr(E1 | e10) + 
                         + [g - u(T01)] Pr(E3 | e10) + [g (1 + r) – u(T00)] Pr( E4 | e10) = 
                                = [G - u(T11)] P1b P3p  + [G (1 + R) – u(T10)] P1b (1 – P3p) + 
                        + [g - u(T01)] (1 – P1b) P0p + [g (1 + r) – u(T00)] (1 – P1b) (1 – P0p) = H – H0’ 
with  
H0’ = u(T11) P1b P3p + u(T10) P1b (1 – P3p) + u(T01) (1 – P1b) P0p + u(T00) (1 – P1b) (1 – P0p).  
 The incentive expected by CB will be: 
(30) E(Ip | ebp) = T10 Pr(E1 | ebp) + T11 Pr(E2  | ebp) + T01 Pr(E3 | ebp) + T00  Pr(E4 | ebp) – Cbp(ebp) 
where Cbp is the cost of the authority when he makes efforts ebp.  
The central banker expects to gain more if he makes an effort to achieve banking stability, if we 
have the same conditions for the monetary stability. Moreover he expects better payment if he 
makes no effort to achieve price stability. This is justified by the awareness that in the electoral 
period, the politician prefers a degree of instability in order to reach his goal, i.e. re-election.  
The incentive and participation constraints, therefore, become : 
(31)  
g1 = E(Ip | e10) - E(Ip | e00) ≥ 0 
g2 = E(Ip | e10) - E(Ip | e11) ≥ 0 
g3 = E(Ip | e10) - E(Ip | e01) ≥ 0 
g4 = E(Ip | e10) ≥ 0 
  or 
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(31)’ 
g1 = g4 - E(Ip | e00) ≥ 0 
g2 = g4 - E(Ip | e11) ≥ 0 
g3 = g4 - E(Ip | e01) ≥ 0 
g4 = E(Ip | e10) ≥ 0 
 
As for the costs Cbp of effort, we define23: 
(32) Cbp(ebp) =    
0                  if    e00                    
Cbp               if    e11
Cbp – Cp        if    e10  
Cbp – Cb       if    e01. 
Also here Cbp is constant, as Cb and Cp. 
 
6. Comparison of the two contracts in the electoral period. 
We have seen that in the election period, if the politician appoints two agents, his expected utility is: 
E(U-u | e10) = H – H0. 
On the other hand, the utility expected by the politician, when he entrusts the task to a single agent 
is  
     (1)’     E(U-u | e10) = H – H0’ 
To prove that in the electoral period it is to the politician’s advantage to give the two tasks to a 
single agent - for an appropriate allocation of the size of incentive payments Tij, compatible with 
the constraints (C1)(see appendix C.) gk ≥ 0 for k = 1,2,3,4 - one needs to show that it is possible to 
have   
H0’ ≤ H0.  
                                                 
23 For the problem of constrained optimization see appendix C.). 
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